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  Cornhusker Economics 
“The Only Thing That Is Constant Is Change”:  
A Brief Overview on How Technology Has Changed Futures Markets 
Part II 
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  In our previous Cornhusker Economics 
(10/28/2015) we talked about the emergence of 
electronic trading in futures markets and new 
trading practices that came with it. In particular, 
we discussed spoofing and mentioned the trial 
in Chicago of a trader accused of “spoofing” 
commodity futures markets. As I write this arti-
cle,  a “breaking news” alert, pops up on my 
computer screen which informs me that the trial 
is over and the jury has just reached a verdict. As 
the Financial Times reports, the trader was 
found guilty on 12 accounts, “including intend-
ing to defraud other traders by flooding gold, 
corn, soybeans, foreign exchange and crude oil 
futures markets with small orders with the in-
tent of cancelling them” (i.e. spoofing). 
 
Throughout the trial in Chicago, some interest-
ing points emerged during the arguments from 
the prosecutor and defense attorneys. The first 
one was that it is not easy to prove that any giv-
en trader is really spoofing the market. Indeed, 
this implies proving that orders were intention-
ally placed to be cancelled before execution. 
Without records showing this kind of intention, 
it is not always easy to prove it. A typical line of 
defense is that the trader actually intended to 
execute all the orders, and that fast order cancel-
lations are a normal and legitimate practice in 
the new world of high-frequency trading (HFT). 
In fact, there is nothing new about cancelling 
orders; traders have done that since the begin-
ning of  trading  times.   In the  environment of  
November 4, 2015 
Market Report  Year 
Ago  4 Wks Ago  10-31-15 
Livestock and Products, 
Weekly Average          
Nebraska Slaughter Steers, 
35-65% Choice, Live Weight. . . . . .  .  167.85  117.28  138.14 
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb. . . . .  283.77  213.50  220.29 
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb. . .. .  246.67  192.97  200.83 
Choice Boxed Beef, 
600-750 lb. Carcass. . . . . . . . . . . . . .  251.79  208.44  219.22 
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price 
Carcass, Negotiated. . . . . . . . . . . . . ..  86.31  71.24  60.77 
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass 
51-52% Lean. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  98.02  84.59  81.94 
Slaughter Lambs, wooled and shorn, 
135-165 lb. National. . . . . . .  164.50  155.04  156.73 
National Carcass Lamb Cutout 
FOB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  377.27  359.40  357.69 
Crops, 
Daily Spot Prices          
Wheat, No. 1, H.W. 
Imperial, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5.21  4.27  4.14 
Corn, No. 2, Yellow 
Nebraska City, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  .  3.29  3.54  3.52 
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow 
Nebraska City, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .  9.68  8.07  8.26 
Grain Sorghum, No.2, Yellow 
Dorchester, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6.34  6.00  5.93 
Oats, No. 2, Heavy 
Minneapolis, Mn, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3.42  2.45  2.60 
Feed          
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales, 
Good to Premium, RFV 160-185 
Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . .  215.00  180.00  185.00 
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good 
Platte Valley, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  85.00  75.00  75.00 
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Good 
 Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .  85.00  80.00  77.50 
Dried Distillers Grains, 10% Moisture 
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  112.50  125.00  112.50 
Wet Distillers Grains, 65-70% Moisture 
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  43.00  50.00  49.50 
 ⃰  No Market          
electronic trading and HFT, order cancellations be-
come anonymous and much faster (within seconds or 
even milliseconds), but it can still be a legitimate trad-
ing practice. Just to be clear, cancelling orders is not 
prohibited or illegal; the problem is placing and can-
celling them with the intention to mislead other trad-
ers and profit from that. 
 
Further, according to the Chicago Tribune, the de-
fendant argued that he was not spoofing the market, 
but rather trying to “create a lopsided market that en-
couraged other participants to enter the market so he 
could act as a market maker and profit legitimately 
from the spread between the lowest selling price and 
the highest buying price.” Regardless of the merit of 
his claim, that brings us to the role of a market maker 
in futures markets. Market makers are common play-
ers in financial markets in general, and their function 
is to provide liquidity to the market. Market makers 
are always ready to buy or sell, and they are constantly 
posting bid and ask prices for each commodity (or 
asset) they trade. The bid represents the price at which 
they agree to buy and the ask represents the price at 
which they agree to sell. 
 
Market makers are typically trading all the time. If 
they use futures contracts to buy corn from you at 
their bid price, they want to turn around and sell that 
corn to somebody else at their ask price (and vice-
versa). They offer a service to the market by providing 
liquidity, and the difference between their bid and ask 
(the bid-ask spread) represents how much they charge 
for this service. The bid-ask spread reflects how much 
market makers believe they need to charge in order to 
make a profit from their liquidity-providing job. In 
markets with larger number of participants, it is easier 
to find buyers and sellers and hence market makers 
typically lower their bid-ask spread. In other words, in 
more liquid markets, it is easier to get in and out of 
the market and market makers charge less for their 
service, hence it is “cheaper” to trade. 
 
Has the larger liquidity that emerged with electronic 
trading reduced trading costs? Unfortunately, the an-
swer to this question is not so simple. Several studies 
have investigated the bid-ask spread (our measure of 
trading costs) before and after the adoption of elec-
tronic trading, and during different periods since elec-
tronic trading started. In general, results suggest that  
bid-ask spreads have been reduced. Proponents of 
electronic trading and HFT often claim that the 
new trading systems provide more liquidity to 
markets, which leads to more accurate prices and 
lower trading costs. This has been the main “line of 
defense” for electronic trading and HFT. 
 
However, the story does not end here. Critics argue 
that there are studies that find contrasting results, 
i.e. bid-ask spreads may have risen in some mar-
kets. In addition, bid-ask spreads may have nar-
rowed on average, but there are also concerns 
about the quality of the liquidity that allowed for 
narrower spreads. Automated or algorithmic trad-
ing have created a much larger trading volume, but 
they have also disrupted trading at least a few 
times. There have been reports of some events in 
which market prices swung dramatically within a 
few minutes, affecting the accuracy of market pric-
es and creating more risk for market participants 
(such as the “flash crash” of May 6, 2010). Those 
events were likely caused by improper execution of 
trading orders, such as traders accidentally hitting 
the “wrong button” on their computers or auto-
mated systems malfunctioning. During these dis-
ruptions, the market becomes more volatile, which 
increases the risk for open positions in the market. 
This can trigger built-in controls in automated sys-
tems, leading them to offset their positions and 
thus making those price swings even wilder. An-
other issue observed in those events is that some 
HFT firms seem to have reduced or paused their 
trading for a while, which implies that the market 
would abruptly become less liquid when it actually 
needed that liquidity the most. It would suddenly 
become harder for traders to get out of the market 
during those volatile periods. 
 
Problems with order execution are certainly not 
new, but in the current environment with larger 
and faster orders, they can potentially lead to larger 
and faster disruptions. Critics argue that current 
trading systems lack human judgement. Machines 
just follow a pre-determined set of orders and do 
not have the capacity to judge when they should or 
should not be executed (some people have actually 
been trying to develop trading systems based on  
artificial intelligence, but this is a topic for another 
discussion). When things go wrong, and they now  
can go wrong very fast, the consequences may be dra-
matic until somebody has time to understand what is 
happening and figure out how to stop it. 
 
In principle, electronic trading has brought benefits to 
the market. However, it is not completely clear wheth-
er those benefits are always present or they outweigh 
potential disruptions caused by new trading systems 
and strategies. Either way, the futures market is not 
going back to the open outcry system in the pits. Elec-
tronic trading is here to stay. In reality, the increasing-
ly large volume of futures contracts can only be han-
dled by computers. The question we need to debate is 
not whether we should have electronic trading, but 
rather how we want to shape it. 
 
During last month’s trial, the Chicago Tribune report-
ed an interesting argument. According to the prosecu-
tor, a large chicken producer “was frustrated in its 
efforts to buy corn futures” due to the spoofing prac-
tices that disrupted the corn futures market. The de-
fense attorney argued that “that’s on them – they 
should have invested in algorithms”, suggesting the 
chicken producer was to blame for not keeping up 
with modern trading practices. It is questionable 
whether this particular argument makes sense, but it 
makes me think about a more general question: since 
all trading in futures markets is now electronic, and a 
large (and perhaps increasingly larger) portion of it 
happens faster than human traders can handle, are we 
moving towards a predominantly automated trading 
world? If so, is this really beneficial for market partici-
pants? 
 
The above point related to the chicken producer trying 
to hedge the price of corn also reminds us of the very 
basic nature of futures markets. They were developd to 
provide risk management opportunities and price dis-
covery tools for the industry, i.e. to facilitate trading in 
the commercial world. Speculators were attracted to 
those markets looking to make profits, and the added 
liquidity provided by them was and still is welcome. As 
we discussed before, more liquid markets have several 
advantages and tend to make it easier for commercial 
traders to use futures markets for risk management 
and price discovery. However, it now remains to be 
further debated whether potential disruptions generat-
ed by recent developments in trading systems may 
outweigh the  benefits of the larger  liquidity  provided  
by those systems. Currently, it appears we do not 
have a clear answer to these questions. More and 
better data, along with more research, are needed 
in order to properly address these points. 
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